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Abstract
Explaining emergent structure remains a challenge for all areas of cognitive science, and 
problem solving is no exception. The modern study of insight has drawn attention to 
the issue of emergent cognitive structure in problem solving research. We propose that 
the explanation of insight is beyond the scope of conventional approaches to cogni-
tive science in terms of symbolic representation. Cognition may be better described in 
terms of an open, nonlinear dynamical system. By this reasoning, insight would be the 
self-organization of novel structure. Self-organization is a well-studied phenomenon 
of dynamical systems theory, associated with specific trends in entropy and power-law 
behavior. We present work using nonlinear dynamics to capture these trends in entropy 
and power-law behavior and thus to predict the self-organization of novel cognitive 
structure in a problem-solving task. Future explorations of problem solving will benefit 
from considerations of the continuous nonlinear interactions among action, cognition, 
and the environment.
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1. Introduction
Human behavior in response to problems is at once richly patterned and flexible. We adapt 
our behavior so as to anticipate and control outcomes, spontaneously generating novel 
solutions to problems. The rapid appearance of novel structure is more generally known 
as emergence. We propose that problem solving is a matter of emergent structure. Our 
structured yet flexible response to changing environmental demands is a hallmark of 
cognition. Cognitive science must address both the nature of structure and its emergence. 
Emergent structures have been identified in a broad range of areas including language 
acquisition (Hollich, 2006; MacWhinney, 2005; Regier, 2006; Jones & Smith, 2005), categori-
zation (Quinn, 2006; Younger & Johnson, 2006; Yu, 2006), perceptual integration (Burnham 
& Dodd, 2004; Fingelkurts, Fingelkurts, Krause, Möttönen, & Sams, 2003; Johnson, 2004), 
mathematical reasoning (Empson & Turner, 2006; Rasmussen, Stephan, & Allen, 2004; 
Siegler, 2005), and gaze following (Moore, 2006; Triesch, Teuscher, Deák, & Carlson, 2006). 
In all of these cases, the cognitive system appears to take a sudden leap forward in some 
important sense (e.g., greater abstraction, generality, or efficiency). Emergent cognitive 
structures appear to arise abruptly from prior activity of the system. The resulting structures 
reorganize the cognitive system’s interaction with the environment. Thus, the emergence 
of structure is a radical change in functionality, rather than quantitative improvements. As 
such, emergence leaves gaps that cognitive science must find a way to bridge.
Emergence is an important phenomenon because it promises to reveal key properties 
of the system that produces cognitive structure, as well as the nature of cognitive structure 
itself. What type of system is capable of radically reorganizing itself into a new structure, 
and how might we understand change within such a system? Problem-solving research 
is an ideal starting point for understanding emergence. More than any other subfield of 
cognitive science, problem solving focuses on the ongoing activity of the cognitive system 
that gives rise to new structure. In this article, we argue that problem solving should be 
a central concern for cognitive science at large, because it affords careful investigation of 
emergent structure. First, we review problem-solving research demonstrating the phe-
nomenon of emergence. Next, we explain the profound challenge that emergence poses 
for the conventional symbolic approach to cognition. Finally, we outline an alternative 
approach to emergent structure that has deep implications for our understanding of the 
cognitive system.
2. Emergent Structure in Problem Solving
Examples of emergent cognitive structure can be traced back to early Gestalt research in 
problem solving. For instance, in some of his most well-known work, Köhler (1925) found 
that chimpanzees abruptly generated new strategies for reaching food when their initial 
strategies had proven unsuccessful. Crucially, their initial attempts did not appear to be 
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steps toward the eventual “insightful” solution. For example, after jumping at or reaching 
for food hanging from a high perch, they spontaneously stacked boxes to make a step 
ladder to reach the food. In another situation, they fit two short sticks together to fashion 
a longer stick that could reach food placed outside their cage. As Köhler (1947) pointed 
out, these innovations are exemplary cases of emergence; the new strategy reflects a reor-
ganization of the system, rather than an incremental improvement in their initial strategy. 
Köhler argued that insight is a restructuring of the cognitive system.
Modern research on problem solving has continued to wrestle with emergent phe-
nomena, such as insight. In the dominant modern formulation, discontinuous change in 
problem-solving behavior is assumed to involve a restructuring of an internal represen-
tation of the problem. A solver who begins work on a problem using an inappropriate 
representation may, under some conditions, have the structure of this representation shift 
abruptly, affording a solution (Bowden, Jung-Beeman, Fleck, & Kounios, 2005; Chronicle, 
MacGregor, & Ormerod, 2004; Fleck & Weisberg, 2004; Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005; Knoblich, 
Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001). Insight entails an observable discontinuity in a solver’s approach 
to a problem indicating a restructuring of the solver’s representation of the problem 
(Chronicle et al., 2004; Weisberg, 1996).
Consider the matchstick problem as an example of representational restructuring: a 
solver is asked to arrange six matchsticks so as to form four equilateral triangles. Because 
triangles are two-dimensional shapes, the solver will often begin by experimenting with a 
two-dimensional arrangement of the matchsticks (Weisberg, 1996). This approach reflects 
a two dimensional representation of the problem. After forming one triangle with three 
matchsticks and a second triangle with two more matchsticks, the solver is left unsure 
what to do with the sixth matchstick. So long as the solver represents the problem two 
dimensionally, every attempt will be a variation of this unsuccessful approach. The solu-
tion is to arrange the matchsticks to form a tetrahedron, a three-dimensional shape with 
six edges (one for each matchstick) and four triangular faces. Thus, only when the solver’s 
representation of the problem changes to allow a three-dimensional construction, can 
the problem be solved. The important point here is that the tetrahedron solution requires 
radically restructuring the current representation of the problem. This restructuring results 
in a new conception of the problem. 
Emergent structure is not limited to the initial insight into a problem. Even when 
an initial strategy is successful, continued experience with a problem can lead to more 
efficient strategies for arriving at correct solutions. This type of strategy change reflects a 
restructuring of the representation of the problem, a fundamentally different way of ap-
proaching the problem, rather than a quantitative improvement in the existing strategy 
(Dixon & Kelley, 2006, 2007; Siegler, 2005, 2006; Torbeyns, Arnaud, Lemaire, & Verschaffel, 
2004). For example, the solver may suddenly adopt a more abstract representation of the 
problem or a more efficient route to the solution. 
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An example of strategy change may be found in the literature on the development 
of children’s arithmetic skills. When children are learning simple addition, they are often 
asked to sum two addends. To reach a solution, children usually begin with quite simple 
strategies, but soon discover more complex strategies as they repeatedly solve problems. 
Siegler (2005, 2006) has made an extensive investigation of these transitions. One of the 
earliest strategies, the sum strategy, involves putting up the number of fingers specified 
by each addend and counting them all. For example, given the problem “2 + 4 = ?,” a child 
using the sum strategy will extend two fingers on one hand and four fingers on the other 
and count her fingers from 1 to 6. The sum strategy reflects the simplest representation 
of the problem: combining two numbers to produce a third. After using the sum strategy 
repeatedly, many children spontaneously discover the min strategy. The min strategy 
involves the child extending as many fingers as the smaller of the two addends and then 
counting up from the larger addend. For example, given the same problem as above (i.e., 
2 + 4 = ?), the child will say “four” and then count 5 and 6, often extending a finger for each 
count. The min strategy reflects a restructuring of the representation of the problem. For the 
child, addition is no longer simple combination but is instead the incrementing of a large 
number by the magnitude of a smaller number. A child who discovers the min strategy is 
now sensitive to the relative magnitude of the addends and, arguably, has a more abstract 
grasp of addition (Siegler & Jenkins, 1989), as well as a more efficient strategy. Strategy 
change is the emergence of a new structure for representing the problem.
3. Symbolic Systems and Emergence
Emergence of new structure is clearly a fundamental property of the cognitive system 
(Bickhard, 2004). If we are to pursue a deeper understanding of cognition, we will need 
to consider the nature of emergence and the kinds of structure to which it gives rise. Any 
description of emergence in cognition requires some characterization of cognitive struc-
ture. The dominant approach in cognitive science is to characterize cognitive structure as 
symbolic representation (Barsalou, 1999; Dietrich & Markman, 2003). A symbol stands for 
some referent in the environment. Computation over the symbols in the cognitive system 
occurs via a set of syntactic rules. Newell and Simon were among the original champions 
of this approach to cognition (Newell & Simon, 1956, 1976). They proposed that informa-
tion is transmitted through the nervous systems much in the same way that information 
shuttles through a computer. According to their view, information was encoded into 
symbols that served to represent the environment. These symbols then provide the basic 
units of cognitive structure. This formulation was convenient, both for theory construction 
and for computational simulations of intelligence. Newell and Simon modeled problem-
solving behavior as computations over symbolic representations. 
Convenience aside, the commitment to symbolic representation turns out to be 
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problematic. Since the rise of symbolic representation as the modal approach to cognition, 
a number of challenges to this conceptualization have been identified: the homunculus 
problem (cf. Bickhard & Terveen, 1995), the symbol grounding problem (Glenberg, 1997; 
Glenberg & Robertson, 2000; Harnad, 1990; Searle, 1980; Zwann & Taylor, 2006), the cor-
respondence error problem (Bickhard, 1993, 1996; Fodor, 1990), and the frame problem 
(Bickhard, 2001; Dennett, 1984: Haselager, 1997; Pylyshyn, 1987). These problems are all 
symptomatic of a general program that has been described as encodingism, a view that 
Bickhard and Terveen (1995) present as a major obstacle to reconciling cognitive theory 
with fundamental properties of biological systems, including emergence. 
According to encodingism, the cognitive system assembles bits of information from 
the environment to form representations. These encodings are simplistic, symbolic pointers 
to objects in the environment. They indicate central features belonging to the represented 
objects, and the encodings thus underspecify the actual objects in the environment (Fodor, 
2000). Despite their underspecification, these encodings must stand in strong, point-by-
point, feature-by-feature correspondence with the represented objects to do work for the 
cognitive system. Bickhard and Terveen (1995) argued that the emergence of an encoding 
would be very difficult to explain. Encodingism, they noted, posits that symbols are the 
smallest unit of meaning. Symbols can be combined together to represent more complex 
meanings, but there is no way for a genuinely new meaning to enter the system. Symbols 
do not have the power to create new symbol-referent relations, because those relations 
are not, by definition, available to the system. New symbols cannot be created and placed 
in relation to the other symbols in such a system, except by an external intelligent agent. 
Emergence of novel structure requires a flexibility that would be difficult to achieve with 
a symbolic representation. 
4. Dynamical interactions and emergence of cognitive structure
Cognitive science has an alternative to the inflexibility of symbolic representation. Devel-
oping alongside the symbolic approach has been a competing interpretation of cogni-
tive structure as arising from dynamics. Interestingly, this interpretation comes from the 
same Gestalt psychologists who also pioneered insight research. According to the Gestalt 
theory, psychological reality was not a direct, linear mapping of physiological reality, and 
cognitive structure emerges not from the sum of elemental encodings but from their 
interactions (Wertheimer, 1938). Wertheimer proposed a theory grounding structure in 
the dynamics of the cognitive system. In this case, structure is not a symbolic construction 
to be included or produced by computation, but is instead an organization of physical 
forces. In more recent times and separate from the Gestalt tradition, Bickhard (2004) has 
also indicated that dynamical interactions may be a powerful alternative to encodingism. 
Bickhard proposes that the physics of dynamical interactions are the non-representational 
foundation from which representation actually emerges. 
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5. Equilibrium vs. nonequilibrium
In some ways, the early Gestalt psychologists were far ahead of their time, so far that the 
appropriate physics for emergent structure had yet to be developed. They had a sophisti-
cated theory of cognitive structure, but the conceptual and quantitative tools for pursuing 
the theoretical and empirical questions raised by this theory were simply not yet available 
(Epstein, 1988; Shaw & Turvey, 1981). In the days of Wertheimer (1923) and Köhler (1947), 
the only physics available was an extension of Newtonian mechanics, as epitomized by 
Boltzmann (1886/1974). Boltzmann is the scientist most often credited with formalizing 
and drawing together almost three centuries of thermodynamics, a field concerned with 
the interplay between matter and energy. Energy flow and material structure are intimately 
bound up in one another, and they behave in lawful, predictable ways. 
At the time of Boltzmann (1886/1974), the rules of thermodynamics seemed to be 
few and simple. The first law was that energy cannot be created or destroyed. Energy was 
useful to the extent that it could do work. Formally, work is the capacity to move matter, 
whether this means simple displacement through space or more complex chemical reac-
tions. To the degree that such transformations comprise the gross structure of a physical 
system, work is the capacity in a system for structure. The second law was that the amount 
of free energy is always decreasing. Through the many displacements and reactions, a 
small fraction of the total energy in a physical system was irretrievably lost. So, as time 
progressed, fewer and fewer structured processes could take place. 
The second law of thermodynamics had far reaching implications for all physical 
systems. It required that all physical systems follow the same trajectory toward a final 
state, called equilibrium. Equilibrium is a thoroughly disordered regime; one in which 
there is no free energy and, therefore, no structure (e.g., see Prigogine, 1961; Zumdahl & 
Zumdahl, 2006 for further discussion of this definition). At equilibrium, all distributions 
of matter and energy are homogeneous throughout, and no portion of the system is 
distinguishable from another. The degree of disorder or lost energy was quantified as 
entropy. Entropy is a statistic describing the uncertainty of sampling from a given prob-
ability distribution. Entropy, abbreviated as S, in its discrete, informational-theoretic form, 
is expressed as follows:
             
where the given probability distribution has n elements and where p
i
 is the probability of 
the ith value of the distribution (Shannon, 1948). The Boltzmann (1886/1974) worldview is 
that of physical systems whose structure is continuously dissolving with each transforma-
tion, leading to a final endpoint of completely disordered stasis (i.e., maximal entropy). 
Thus, all systems tend toward greater entropy over time (Boltzmann 1886/1974; Prigogine, 
1961; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984; Swenson & Turvey, 1991). 
  
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Gestalt theory described physical systems as tending toward equilibrium (see Kohler, 
1947). Gestalt laws of organization were intended to organize structure at thermodynamic 
equilibrium. That is to say, the early Gestalts treated cognitive structure as a natural con-
sequence of converging physical forces. Once these forces had arranged themselves so 
as to affect equilibrium, the psychological state was achieved. However, as we have just 
noted, equilibrium is actually the absence of structure. Therefore, thermodynamic equi-
librium seemed, ultimately, a poor candidate for explaining the emergence of cognitive 
structure.
Theorists familiar with these concepts undoubtedly ran headlong into just this quan-
dary, and it is probably no coincidence that physics fell from favor as an explanation of 
cognitive structure. When Gestalt theory was initially founded, alternatives to Boltzmann 
(1886/1974) thermodynamics had not been identified, and there were no explanations 
of self-organizing structure. Self-organization requires new interpretations of physics. 
Some suggestions have come from irreversible thermodynamics (Iberall, 1977; Prigogine, 
1961, 1980, Soodak & Iberall, 1987) and synergetics (Haken, 1983, 2000). These suggestions 
arose from the recognition of an important distinction, that between closed systems and 
open systems. The second law of thermodynamics states that entropy will increase and 
equilibrium will be achieved, but this law holds only for closed systems. Open systems are 
considerably more flexible in their ability to deal with entropy and their distance from equi-
librium, and they call for a physics of self-organization. The physics of self-organization are 
well matched to Gestalt theory, and we might imagine that a process like self-organization 
was just what the early Gestalt psychologists had in mind. The early Gestalt psychologists 
could not have articulated the appropriate physics for the dynamics they envisioned, but 
now that we know more about self-organization, cognitive science can better realize the 
Gestalt intuitions (Haken, Stadler, Ditzinger, & Haynes, 2005). 
6. The self-organization alternative
Self-organization is a potential property of open systems. The distinction between open 
and closed systems hinges on interactions between a system and its environment. Closed 
systems do not exchange any energy with their surrounding environment. In closed sys-
tems, dynamics work to maximize entropy. Entropy is unusable energy and, equivalently, a 
measure of disorder. Increasing entropy dissolves structure and leads a system to greater 
homogeneity. The cognitive system exhibits progressive complexity of structure, such 
as would not be possible in a closed system, and is clearly part of a larger system that 
exchanges matter and energy with its surroundings. Cognition is not a closed system. 
An open system exchanges energy with its surrounding environment. In fact, many 
open systems thrive on a steady flow of energy. As energy enters into the system, some of 
it is consumed to do work for the system. But energy flow also must produce fluctuations 
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in the system, leading to a more disordered state at the microscopic scale. Thus, the influx 
of energy produces an increase in entropy. Unlike closed systems, however, open systems 
are not required to bottle up this entropy. Instead, open systems can self-organize macro-
scopic structure for the purposes of offloading entropy into the environment. By doing so, 
they regulate energy flow and promote the emergence of macroscopic structure.
The offloading of entropy is closely tied to the emergence of structure. The example 
of Rayleigh-Bénard convection from fluid dynamics illustrates the general principles of 
self-organization (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984). In the Rayleigh-Bénard paradigm, a flame is 
placed below a dish of fluid producing a temperature gradient within the fluid. A tempera-
ture gradient is simply a graded difference in temperature; fluid molecules nearer to the 
flame have a higher temperature than fluid molecules farther from the flame. Temperature 
is directly related to the average velocity of the molecules. Thus, imposing a temperature 
gradient increases the velocity of fluid molecules, producing fluctuations and increasing 
entropy. In order for the fluid to maintain stability, it must offload this entropy somehow. 
The ability of the fluid to offload the incoming heat or entropy depends on the structural 
arrangement of the molecules. As entropy builds up, the fluid molecules spontaneously 
reconfigure themselves to form a web of hexagonal convection cells. The convecting cells 
serve to push warmer molecules up, away from the heat source, and send down cooler 
molecules to replace the warmer ones. The spontaneous restructuring obviously takes 
place without a governing plan, rather it is a function of the interacting properties of the 
system. 
As the fluid convection example illustrates, entropy and self-organization are inter-
twined. Self-organization is the means by which a system shifts into a new configuration, 
allowing the system to offload unwanted entropy. But by the same token, entropy is the 
stress that provokes self-organization in the first place. Given this tight relationship, changes 
in entropy provide an important window into self-organization. As energy flows into an 
open system, entropy increases and continues to increase until it reaches a critical thresh-
old. At this critical threshold, the system must either dissolve under the stress of entropic 
fluctuations or reorganize itself so as to offload entropy. The increase in entropy leading 
up to the critical threshold is consistent with reversible thermodynamics (Boltzmann, 
1886/1974), but understanding the drop in entropy requires irreversible thermodynamics 
(Prigogine, 1961, 1980). Irreversible thermodynamics addresses the drop in entropy as a 
consequence of reorganization of the system, that is, the emergence of new structure. This 
reduction of entropy has been termed negative entropy, or negentropy (Brillouin, 1962; 
Schrödinger, 1944). When we want to identify self-organization, we should be able to find 
this brief period of negentropy just before the emergence of new structure. 
We suggest that human problem solvers are an open dynamical system, and prob-
lems are, of course, part of the environment. Emergent structure is the self-organized 
result of energy flow between the solver and the problem. Entropy is a crucial indicator 
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of where a system sits on the trajectory to self-organization. What self-organizes is a soft-
assembled attractor, a mode of function toward which a dynamical system will gravitate. 
We join a wide literature (see Thelen & Smith, 1994; Smith, 2005 for reviews) in describing 
cognitive structure as a self-organizing attractor. In our own problem-solving research, 
we have attempted to use qualities of dynamical organization to predict the emergence 
of such an attractor. The implementation of this research program has been facilitated by 
recent developments in both embodied cognition and nonlinear dynamics. In the next 
paragraphs, we will describe these developments in greater detail.
7. Interactivity of action and cognition
If we want to assess the entropy of the cognitive system, we need to know where to look. 
A central challenge for dynamical accounts of cognition has been capturing fine-grained, 
moment-to-moment changes in mental activity. How can we get measures of the dynamics 
of the mind? On first consideration, this may appear to be an insurmountable challenge. 
However, recent work suggests that action and cognition are joined in a massively inter-
connected and interactive system. 
Traditional approaches to cognitive science have presumed that action is a down-
stream product of cognition. Cognition, on this account, functions as a central executive 
and the action system simply follows its commands. Current evidence strongly challenges 
this view, however. For example, Zwaan and Taylor (2006) reported an action-compatibility 
effect in reading comprehension. They asked participants to make sensibility judgments 
of sentences while also turning a dial. Comprehension of the text was quicker when the 
sentences described motions similar to the direction of the dial rotation (e.g., “turn up the 
volume on the stereo” describes a motion similar to clockwise rotation), and comprehen-
sion was slower when the sentences described motions conflicted with the direction of 
dial rotation (e.g., “turn down the volume on the stereo” would conflict with clockwise 
rotation).
The tight relationship between action and cognition appears to be a very general 
phenomenon, not one restricted to dial rotation or other unusual paradigms. For example, 
Borghi, Glenberg, & Kaschak (2004) showed that simply describing the location of the 
participant in relation to an imagined object (e.g., “You are driving a car.”, “You are fueling 
a car.”) affected the speed with which they could judge whether something was part of 
the car (e.g., “headlights”). Importantly, the effect of perspective depended on whether 
the part could be acted upon from that perspective.    
A growing corpus of evidence from the literature on embodied cognition shows that 
cognition is intimately connected to the body and its actions. Cognition is not isolated or 
inaccessible; its activity is in evidence in the spatial and temporal changes in bodily action. 
Put differently, there is only one highly interactive system at play in generating behavior. 
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Because the system is massively interactive, changes propagate across the entire system, 
in much the same way as ripples propagate across a pool. Indeed, it has been shown that 
in an interactive system the dynamics of any variable can be used to reconstruct the dy-
namics of the entire system (Kantz & Schreiber, 1997; Sauer, Yorke, & Casdagli, 1991; Takens, 
1981). Therefore, action can give us access to cognitive dynamics. 
8. Self-organization of cognitive structure: Two key indicators
The issue of reconstructing the dynamics of the cognitive system brings us to the second 
recent development underlying our approach. Advances in nonlinear dynamics have taken 
strides toward capturing self-organization in behavior (Abarbanel, 1996). In our work, we 
have focused on key indicators of self-organization. The first indicator we will discuss is 
entropy. We will review work that has investigated the role of entropy in predicting the 
self-organization of a new cognitive structure. The second indicator we will discuss is 
power-law behavior. Below, we will present further evidence from the work reviewed 
demonstrating changes in power-law behavior leading up to the self-organization of 
this cognitive structure. In each case, our purpose is to predict the emergence of a new 
attractor in the cognitive system using these dynamical indicators.
9. Entropy
As we have noted above, in our discussion of thermodynamics, entropy is closely related 
to the self-organization of new attractors. Theoretically, the two concepts are bound up 
in one another. Self-organizing attractors are a tendency of a system toward order, and 
entropy is the disorder in a system. Nevertheless, a critical level of entropy in a system is 
precisely the stimulus for self-organization of a new attractor. Entropy and attractors are 
similarly related in terms of dynamical analyses. Concretely, they constitute the two op-
posite attributes of the phase-space trajectory, and phase space will be a necessary part of 
the dynamical tools needed to predict the emergence of cognitive structure. This section 
will describe both the meaning of phase space and the procedure involved in evaluating 
phase space for entropy and attractors. 
Phase space is essentially the high-dimensional set of points of which a subset 
composes the trajectory of a dynamical system. Dynamical systems are, by the simplest 
definition, systems that change. These changes may occur across any of the dynamical 
system’s dimensions. The value of each dimension may be expressed as a number. The 
value of all dimensions of a system for a given point in time is known as the system’s phase; 
it is a multidimensional point. Phase space is the set of all phases that a system might 
inhabit. We may find in phase space a multidimensional trajectory describing the entire 
behavior of the system. For example, Lorenz (1963) modeled Rayleigh-Bénard convection 
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in terms of three dimensions. The first dimension describes the divergence of flow. The 
second dimension is the slope of the temperature gradient. The third dimension is the 
nonlinearity of the temperature gradient. A three-dimensional trajectory expressing all of 
these values simultaneously is the Lorenz model’s phase space. If a system’s dimensions 
fluctuate randomly, the system’s phase-space trajectory wanders, diverging from earlier 
portions of the trajectory. Divergence of phase-space trajectory indicates entropy. When 
a system starts to visit similar phases and repeatedly approximates earlier portions of its 
trajectory, phase space converges. The convergence of the phase-space trajectory is an 
attractor. 
The primary challenge of capturing phase space has been the problem of dimension-
ality. The dynamics of cognition have been more elusive than those of Rayleigh-Bénard 
convection. Unlike the Lorenz (1963) system, biological systems exhibiting cognition are 
complex and high-dimensional. Because capturing phase space has traditionally required 
a thorough accounting of dimensions, the phase space in cognition has not been as read-
ily available as in the Lorenz system. Fortunately, nonlinear dynamics has refined Takens’s 
(1981) method for reconstructing phase space (Abarbanel, 1996). This method has proven 
a fruitful technique for studying a variety of nonlinear systems (Kantz & Schreiber, 1997; 
Sauer, Yorke, & Casdagli, 1991).1 Once phase space has been reconstructed, it is possible to 
assess the dynamical organization and attractor strength using recurrence quantification 
analysis (RQA; Webber & Zbilut, 1994, 2005).2 With RQA, it is possible to evaluate attractor 
strength and to estimate the entropy—or disorder—of the reconstructed phase space. 
Entropy in RQA applies Eq. 1 to the runs of recurrences in the phase-space trajectory.
2RQA (Webber & Zbilut, 1994, 2005) essentially sets up a neighborhood around each point, a neighborhood that 
is some small percentage of the average distance among all of the points. Remember that the formation of an at-
tractor is a convergence of the phase-space trajectory. When a point A falls within the neighborhood of an earlier 
point B, point A and point B make what’s called a recurrent pair. RQA counts all of the recurrent pairs in phase space. 
The consecutive recurrent pairs form lines. The lengths of these lines provide a measure of attractor strength. The 
Shannon (1948) entropy of these lengths provides a measure of disorder in this attractor.
1In broad terms, Takens’ (1981) theorem states that, for an interactive complex system, it is possible to unpack the 
geometry of the entire system from a single univariate observable from any variable composing the system. The 
time series of the single univariate observable can be projected into a higher dimensional space. The implication of 
this theorem is that perfect knowledge of underlying mechanism is not, at the outset, necessary for taking global 
measures of system dynamics. A single time series can be expanded to reflect the dynamics of the entire system. 
Takens’ (1981) theorem specified a time-delay method for reconstructing the phase space of global dynamics from 
a single, densely sampled univariate time series (Sauer, Yorke, & Casdagli, 1991). This method involves embedding 
the original time series in a higher dimensional space. This embedding is done by plotting the original time series 
against lagged copies of itself. The lag is determined by the timestep of the first local minimum in the autocorrela-
tion of the time series. This lag ensures that the embedding dimensions are maximally orthogonal to the original 
time series.  Use of Takens’ theorem comes with the caveat of numerous formal assumptions, rarely met fully in any 
particular data set. For example, Takens’ theorem assumes an unbounded number of measurements and error-free 
measurement. That said, the technique remains a valuable analysis strategy robust to the inevitable violations of 
these assumptions, and it has been used throughout the physical and biological sciences to predict emergence 
of nonlinear, chaotic structure (e.g., Garcia, DeLancey, Almeida, & Chapman, 2007; Hirata, Suzuki, & Aihara, 2008; 
Martinerie, et al., 1998; Waelbroeck, López-Peña, Morales, & Zertuche, 1994). 
The Self-Organization of Insight 83
• volume 2, no. 1 (Spring 2009)
Figure 1. Top panel shows the phase space of the Lorenz system through a phase transi-
tion. The system begins in a disk-shaped homoclinic orbit. With an increase in the tem-
perature gradient, the Lorenz system migrates upwards into a transient until it settles 
into a butterfly-shaped attractor. Bottom panel shows the trend in RQA entropy across 
four consecutive stages of the Lorenz phase transition, from left to right: disk attractor, 
departure from disk to transient, transient settling into new attractor, and emergence of 
butterfly-shaped attractor.
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To illustrate the utility of the entropy measure for predicting the emergence of new 
structure, we return to the Rayleigh-Bénard example. Before, we described how a tem-
perature gradient led to the emergence of structure in the convecting fluid. We also saw 
that this structure could be modeled in terms of an attractor in three dimensions (Lorenz, 
1963). To evaluate the ability of RQA entropy to predict the emergence of new structure, 
we simulated the effect of making the temperature gradient suddenly steeper in the 
Lorenz model. According to nonequilibrium thermodynamics (Nicolis & Prigogine, 1977; 
Prigogine, 1961, 1980), increasing the temperature gradient would lead to an increase of 
entropy, and once entropy had peaked, the system would reorganize into a new structure, 
reducing entropy and forming a new attractor. The radical change in the phase-space 
trajectory from one attractor to another is called a phase transition. 
We modeled a logistic increase in the temperature gradient using the standard Lorenz 
system. The top panel of Figure 1 shows the phase-space trajectory of the Lorenz system as 
it undergoes a phase transition. At lower temperatures, the Lorenz system remained in an 
orbit. As temperature increased, the Lorenz system spun out of this orbit into a disordered 
transient. Finally, at higher temperatures, the model fell into a new butterfly-shaped attrac-
tor. We ran RQA on overlapping windows of this Lorenz simulation, from start to finish. We 
plotted entropy across time (see the bottom panel of Figure 1). As is evident, RQA entropy 
peaks as the Lorenz system leaves the orbit and drops as it settles into the new attractor. 
The phase transition shown in top panel of Figure 1 is well captured by RQA entropy. The 
major point here is that entropy provides a theoretically grounded, meaningful measure 
of system behavior that provides important information about a phase transition in a 
dynamical system. 
Taken together, phase-space reconstruction and RQA provide the means for assess-
ing entropy of the cognitive system from a single, univariate time series. We conjectured 
that it might be possible to capture the dynamical qualities of the cognitive system with 
a single univariate time series of motor actions. 
10. Gear-system problems: Representational change as a phase transition
We now weave the strands of embodied cognition and nonlinear dynamics back into a 
problem-solving project, and specifically, we apply these ideas to a cognitive phenom-
enon: representational change. The remainder of this review deals with the gear-system 
paradigm (Dixon & Bangert, 2002, 2004; Dixon & Dohn, 2003; Dixon & Kelley, 2006, 2007; 
Stephen, Dixon, & Isenhower, in press; Trudeau & Dixon, 2007). In the gear-system task, 
participants are presented with a number of gear systems on a computer screen. Each 
gear system forms a pathway of interlocking gears beginning with a driving gear that 
bears an arrow indicating turning direction (Figure 2). The gears never move, but the task 
of the participant is to correctly predict the turning direction of final gear. The possible 
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Figure 2. Five examples of gear systems. The gear systems vary on three dimensions: size, 
number of pathways, and presence of an extraneous gear. Small gear systems (top left, 
middle left, and bottom) consist of 4 or 5 gears; large gear systems (top right and middle 
right) consist of 7 or 8 gears. Gear systems have one pathway (top left and top right) or 
two pathways (middle left, middle right, and bottom). An extraneous gear is one that does 
not contribute to the turning direction of the final gear (bottom).
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responses are “clockwise,” “counterclockwise,” and, if the final gear is pushed in both ways 
at once, “jam.” The participants receive feedback on their prediction before moving on to 
the next gear system. Typically, participants complete 36 trials. 
By and large, participants are able to correctly predict the turning direction of the 
final gear, but the gear-system problem serves as an interesting case of representational 
change (see Dixon & Kelley, 2006; 2007). Participants usually begin solving gear-system 
problems through use of an approach we call force-tracing. The gears never move, as 
noted above, but were they to move, they would exhibit a transfer of forces, a pushing 
and pulling among the gear teeth across the pathway of gears. When using this strategy, 
participants trace the force across the gears with their dominant hand or forefinger. Tracing 
would begin on the driving gear, in the direction of the arrow indicating its turning direc-
tion, and tracing would continue until the final gear. Participants produce their solution 
based on the motion of their forefinger around the final gear. The force-tracing strategy 
leads reliably to correct solutions, and participants usually use the force-tracing strategy 
for quite a few trials.
After several trials of successful use of the force-tracing strategy, an interesting shift 
occurs (Dixon & Bangert, 2002; Dixon & Kelley, 2006, 2007). Participants suddenly discover 
that the gears form an alternating sequence. That is, a gear turning clockwise would be 
followed by a gear turning counter-clockwise, and vice versa. Once participants discover 
this relation in the gear system, they exhibit the spontaneous emergence of new cognitive 
structure, the alternation strategy. In the alternation strategy, participants simply point or 
otherwise indicate each successive gear, classifying it as either “clockwise” or “counter-
clockwise.” The discovery of the alternation strategy indicates a qualitative shift in the 
participants’ representation of the gear-system problem. The representation of the gear 
system as a series of rotating parts is replaced by the emergent representation of the gear 
system as an alternating sequence. 
The discovery of alternation in the gear-system problem reflects aspects of both 
embodiment and dynamical systems theory. Dixon and Bangert (2002) explained the 
phenomenon as a case of embodying relational information. Force-tracing is a strategy 
that directly involves the bodily action of moving the forefinger along a trajectory avail-
able in the visual display of the gear system. Sufficient relational information leads to 
the emergence of the new representation. Along lines suggested by Thelen and Smith 
(1994) and Kugler and Turvey (1987), Dixon & Kelley (2006, 2007) began to speculate on 
the possibility that the shift from one representation of the gear system to another could 
be a phase transition. By this reasoning, representations of the gear systems are organiza-
tions of the cognitive system that afford solution. The force-tracing representation is an 
organization that specifies manual embodiment of the gear systems. The force-tracing 
motions themselves serve as the dynamical interactions through which a new structure 
self-organizes. The new, emergent organization of the cognitive system specifies sequen-
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tial categorization of the gears as clockwise-turning or counter-clockwise-turning. The 
explanation on offer was that problem-solving behavior was the dynamically organized 
embodiment of a task environment. 
We elaborated on this explanation of strategy change with predictions based solely 
on the entropy of action (Stephen et al., in press). In doing so, we sought to test the broad 
predictions from the dynamical systems theory of cognition (Kugler & Turvey, 1987; 
Thelen & Smith, 1994). According to this theory, a cognitive organism is an open dynami-
cal system. This dynamical system is embedded in a structured environment with which 
it interacts continuously. These interactions occur through action as well as through all 
those biological functions supporting action. The metabolism of energy in the environ-
ment leads to fluctuations within the organism. These fluctuations constitute the same 
influx of entropy arising from the metabolism of energy as in any other open dynamical 
system. Cognitive structures emerge as a natural function of an open dynamical system’s 
tendency to offload entropy. The emergence of a new representation should be marked 
by a sudden increase of entropy, reflecting a critical instability, followed by negentropy, 
that is, a rapid decrease in entropy (Brillouin, 1962; Schrödinger, 1944). Negentropy would 
be indicative of the self-organization of a new representation. 
A combined use of motion tracking and nonlinear dynamics allowed us to predict 
the emergence of the alternation representation (Stephen et al., in press). In all respects, 
we replicated the procedure for the gear-system task used previously by Dixon and col-
leagues (Dixon & Bangert, 2002, 2004; Dixon & Dohn, 2003). The only addition was the 
use of motion tracking on the forefinger of each participant’s dominant hand. For each 
trial, we calculated the angular velocity time series for the participant’s force-tracing. 
Using the angular velocity time series, we applied the methods described above1, 2 to 
reconstruct the phase space of the force-tracing motions and to capture the dynamical 
quality of these motions, separately for each trial. Specifically, we used RQA entropy to 
model the discovery of alternation. We reconstructed phase space and computed RQA 
for each trial for participants who had not yet discovered alternation. We modeled the 
discovery of alternation with event-history analysis, using RQA entropy to predict to the 
event of discovery. Just before discovery, there was a peak in entropy and a subsequent 
drop in entropy. This finding served as support for a dynamical systems interpretation of 
strategy change.
11. Power-law behavior
The second key indicator of self-organization that we employed was power-law behavior. 
Power-law behavior is a particular type of statistical relationship in which the activity of 
the system is interrelated across multiple levels or scales. In a power-law relationship the 
frequency and the magnitude of the behavior can be described as a power function: 
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Figure 3. Top panel illustrates an idealization of a power law 
relating power to frequency. Bottom panel shows the same 
power law in a double-log plot. The hyperbolic curve in the 
top panel on a standard plot becomes an approximately 
linear trend in double-log plot. The exponent for the power 
law in the top panel can be approximated by the slope of 
the linear trend in the bottom panel.
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P( f ) = kf -a                                                                                                                            (2)
log P( f ) = log kf -a                                                                                                       (3)
log P( f ) = log k + f –a                                                                                              (4)
log P( f ) = log k - α log f,                                                (5)
where P is power as a function of frequency f, involving a positive constant k and a scaling 
exponent α. The top panel of Figure 3 shows an example of a power-law relationship.  
One way to understand power-law behavior is in terms of nesting. As observation of 
a system takes on progressively finer grain, progressively more detail is uncovered. Each 
element of the system is made up of smaller elements, which are themselves made up of 
yet smaller elements, and so on. There are no fundamental, indivisible units in such nested 
structure. What remain fundamental are the relationships among elements. At all scales 
of observation, the dynamics are the same. In this case, structure is driven by interactions 
rather than by separable components (Jensen, 1998).
The link between self-organization and power-law behavior is embedded in the de-
tails of how self-organization occurs. Because self-organizing systems reform themselves 
into new structures (in the absence of a controlling external agent), the current configura-
tion of micro-elements (i.e., microscopic constituent parts) must become flexible. At all 
scales, the constraints among micro-elements must break or loosen to some degree before 
the system can change. This breaking apart of micro-elements brings about the nested 
structure that generates power-law behavior. It allows the interactions to dominate the 
behavior of the system. That is, the micro-elements can now explore different structural 
relationships with each other, at every scale. When the micro-elements arrive at a new 
configuration, then the system exhibits different structure (Bak, 1996; Jensen, 1998). 
The degree to which the system exhibits power-law behavior changes as it undergoes 
reorganization. The breaking of constraints increases the degree of power-law behavior 
(i.e., the nested behavior increases). As the system reconfigures, the micro-elements 
are again constrained and power-law behavior decreases.  Figure 4 shows a schematic 
example of the system’s elements breaking apart, and thereby increasing the degree 
of nesting or power-law behavior. Figure 4 illustrates the breaking of constraints across 
three size scales. In reality, this process continues ad infinitum across the size scales (Bak, 
1996; Jensen, 1998).
One standard approach to evaluating the degree of power-law behavior is to run 
spectral analysis on a time series. Spectral analysis decomposes a time series into its con-
stituent oscillations (i.e., sine waves), from very low frequency to very high frequency. It 
describes the dynamics of micro-elements at all time scales; each frequency represents 
a different time scale. The top panel of Figure 3 shows a power-law relationship between 
frequency and power. The bottom panel shows the same relationship plotted on axes of 
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Figure 4. Schematic illustrating the nesting that generates power-law behavior. The mac-
roscopic components apparent in (a) break down into smaller and smaller divisions from 
(b) to (f ) into progressively smaller elements. The tripartite organization at the macroscopic 
scale is found within each of the three elements, and so on down to the more microscopic 
scales. The arrows among the parts indicate the interactions between the elements, that is, 
the dynamics among elements that remain invariant across scales. Large elements popu-
late the system in (a), smaller elements first appear in (b) and overtake the entire system 
in (d), and even smaller elements appear in the rightmost portion of (e). These smallest 
elements spread further in (f ).
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log-power against log-frequency (i.e., a double-log plot). The slope of a linear regression 
of this power spectrum is an estimate of the power-law exponent (see Eqs. 2-5). For a 
power spectrum with slope –α, it is more convenient simply to describe the power-law 
exponent in terms of α. The power-law exponent of a system can vary over time and can 
be an indicator of criticality. As a system approaches a phase transition, its power-law 
exponent will approach a critical value. The critical value of this exponent is the threshold 
value beyond which the system will be at risk for a phase transition. In short, steepness of 
the power-law function is related to the likelihood that a self-organizing system will take 
on a new structure (Van Orden et al., 2003).
As we noted above, the power-law exponent increases toward its critical value, pro-
gressively more constraints within the system are broken, allowing the incipient phase 
transition. In the case of the gear-system problems, we might expect a specific trajectory 
in the power-law behavior of the force-tracing motions. As participants continued force-
tracing, they would be more likely to discover the alternation strategy and thus at greater 
risk for the phase transition that this discovery entails. So, power-law exponents should 
increase as participants continue force-tracing. As the new representation of the gear 
system emerges, power-law behavior decreases, and the constraints of the new structure 
should return. This return of constraints would entail a decrease in power-law exponent 
just before discovery. A power-law exponent of α = 1 has been taken as the standard for 
self-organized criticality and pure interaction-dominant dynamics because it reflects a 
perfect balance between incremental logarithmic power with incremental logarithmic 
frequency. At such a balance, the system is optimally uncommitted to any particular 
configuration (see Bak, 1996; Gilden, 2001; Jensen, 1998; Van Orden et al., 2003). We wish 
to discuss interaction dominance as occurring along a continuum, where α indicates the 
degree to which the system is approaching a phase transition. 
We now present new findings from our work with the gear-system paradigm (Stephen 
et al., 2007, in press). We compiled the angular velocity time series from both studies and 
ran spectral analyses on each trial for each participant, computing the slope to estimate 
power-law exponents. In keeping with our discussion above, we expected that power-
law behavior would first exhibit an increase in power-law exponent (i.e., an extending of 
power-law behavior to longer time-scales) as participants completed more trials of the 
gear-system task without discovering alternation and then a decrease in power-law ex-
ponent (i.e., a weakening of power-law behavior) as participants approached discovery. 
We captured these effects in a simple growth-curve model. The dependent measure, 
α, is modeled as a function of trial number, pre-discovery trial, a dichotomous variable 
distinguishing discoverers from non-discoverers (coded as “everdisc,” since it indexed 
whether participants ever discovered), and an interaction between everdisc and trial num-
ber. Growth-curve modeling is a maximum-likelihood, regression technique developed 
for over-time data analysis. Like ordinary-least-squares multiple regression, it assigns B 
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Figure 5. Power-law exponents of force-tracing motions by trial. Top panel shows a plot 
of power-law exponent by trial, with separate curves for discoverers and non-discoverers. 
Bottom panel shows a plot of power-law exponent by pre-discovery trial, indicating power-
law behavior on the approach to discovery. 
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coefficients to main effects and interactions. The improvement of model fit with each new 
B can be assessed with a single-degree-of-freedom chi-square statistic. This chi-square 
statistic tests the amount of improvement in the deviance of the model, often expressed 
as -2LL, where LL stands for log-likelihood (Singer & Willett, 2003). Figure 5 shows the mean 
power-law exponent for participants who have not yet discovered alternation. As can be 
seen in the figure, the power-law exponent increased over trials as predicted. Interestingly, 
the power-law exponent increased more rapidly for participants who discovered relative 
to non-discovers, B = .01, change in -2 LL χ2 (1) = 4.40, p < .05. The top panel of Figure 5 
shows a separate curve for discoverers and non-discoverers.  Consistent with the predic-
tions described above, the power-law exponent decreased just prior to discovery, B = -.01, 
change in -2 LL χ2 (1) = 4.40, p < .05. This effect is illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure 
5 in which each individual’s trials are aligned on discovery. 
As predicted, the phase transition underlying the discovery of alternation exhibited a 
period of relatively long-range power-law behavior as old structural constraints dissolved 
and as new structural constraints emerged. The implication of this finding is that the cogni-
tive system moves through a continuum of interaction-dominance in order to take on new 
structure. At one end of this spectrum, there would be a regime of complete component-
dominance in which structure might justifiably be decomposed into separable parts. This 
regime of complete component-dominance is characterized by maximal constraint. The 
other end of the spectrum would be a regime of complete interaction-dominance in 
which there are no separable components but only nested interactions. Complementary 
to the regime of complete component-dominance, the regime of complete interaction-
dominance is characterized by fluctuation. 
12. General Discussion
Problem-solving research is the study of cognition as it unfolds in action. Two additional 
facts imbue this seemingly uncontroversial statement with deep implications. First, cog-
nition and action are intertwined in a highly interactive system. While it may seem trivial 
that cognition should have consequences for action, we emphasize the slightly more 
unintuitive converse. Action is not simply a downstream effect of commands from cogni-
tion. Action exerts its own influence on cognition. Here the story gets interesting because 
action entails a continuous exchange with the environment as it must bring about a fit 
between a cognitive system and external constraints. The ability for a cognitive system 
to move adaptively through its environment relies on the system’s openness. Therefore, 
cognition, action, and the environment are involved in a tightly knit process. In this light, 
problem solving can be understood as an open, nonlinear system, and our explanations 
will require the concepts and methods normally brought to bear on such systems.
We propose that the theory of open, nonlinear systems (see Ebeling & Sokolov, 
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2005; Hilborn, 1994; Klimontovich, 1991 for further discussion of this theory) is of utmost 
relevance to problem solving. It provides a compelling account of the unfolding of cogni-
tion in action and the phenomenon of insight. The exchange between an open, nonlinear 
system and its environment leads to complex interactions and energy flows. These interac-
tions and flows amount to perturbations with which the system must cope. The solution 
to such perturbations is the self-organization of new steady states. Action is the complex 
interface at which the cognitive system and environment meet. The self-organizing steady 
states are cognitive structures that emerge as a result of exchanges between the cognitive 
system and environment. Insight is thus emergent structure forged amidst the nonlinear 
interactions of cognition, action, and the environment. 
As controversial as this proposal may seem at first, the core ideas are not new. Köhler 
(1947) suspected long ago that something along these lines was at play. According to 
Gestalt theory, dynamics of the cognitive system in its environment conspire to produce 
insight. All that was missing from the Gestalt enterprise was the correct physics; not 
enough was yet known about the kind of dynamics needed to make the Gestalt theory 
concrete. 
Although the ideas are old, the tractability of putting Köhler’s suspicions to the test 
is new. The recent developments in nonlinear dynamics suggest exciting ways to revisit 
the old interpretations of psychological issues (Haken et al., 2005). In our research, we 
have placed problem solving in dynamical terms, only applying newer aspects of what 
dynamical system theory has to offer. 
13. The gear-system paradigm: Insights from problem solving
In our work with the gear-system paradigm (Dixon & Bangert, 2002, 2004 ; Dixon & Dohn, 
2003; Dixon & Kelley, 2006, 2007; Stephen et al., in press), we have focused on the interac-
tion of the solver with the environment. We propose that these interactions may carry 
subtle structure that has not yet been fully explored and that action captures the fine-
grained details of these interactions. Whereas action has often been treated merely as a 
downstream consequence of existing cognitive structure, we propose that action is crucial 
for understanding the emergence of new cognitive structure. Thus, our work has been 
an attempt to describe cognitive structure as an emergent property of the interactions 
between solver and task environment.
The interaction of a problem-solving system with its environment finds a strong 
parallel with the notion of an open, nonlinear dynamical system. This framework rests 
solely on the assumption that a cognitive system behaves according to the laws of phys-
ics, specifically those of irreversible thermodynamics (Iberall, 1977; Prigogine, 1961, 1980; 
Soodak & Iberall, 1987). Following this framework, we set out to test the hypothesis that 
cognitive structure is a self-organizing consequence of action. Our findings provided 
preliminary support for this prediction. 
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The work reviewed above strikes a contrast with more conventional approaches to 
problem solving that involve representational systems. These representational systems 
often rely on symbols or insular mental processes. On our account, a representation is 
dynamical organization specifying the behavior of a biological system in a given task 
environment. In the conventional interpretations of cognition as a symbolic or mental 
phenomenon, computations play a major role in structuring impoverished sensory inputs 
and structuring actions around preexisting representations (Fodor, 2000). We propose 
that, on the contrary, the continuous, dynamic interactions between an organism and its 
environment are sufficient to generate new cognitive structure. Indeed, we recognize that 
the term “representation” may no longer apply to our description of cognitive structure. A 
representation would entail an intermediary cognition structure between organism and 
environment and an indirect relationship between the two. The dynamical organization 
does not represent information to any mental faculty but, rather, directly embodies the 
environmental structure to which it refers (Thelen & Smith, 1994).
Our approach to problem solving deviates dramatically from the traditional ap-
proaches taken more frequently in cognitive science. We propose that it is both possible 
and instructive to consider cognitive structure in non-representational terms. Clearly, 
problem-solving behavior reflects structure in the cognitive system. This structure appears 
sufficiently stable in the short term to have merited a symbolic description. However, if 
we wish to tackle the issue of emergent structure that lies at the heart of problem solv-
ing, the symbolic description will benefit from a thoroughly nonsymbolic account from 
nonlinear dynamics. Taking a step in this direction means reconciling symbolic description 
with the morphology and dynamics of embodiment. In this view, structure in problem-
solving behavior is a by-product of self-organization. Improvement of performance and 
optimization remain the important factors, but our approach simply phrases these factors 
in the subsymbolic terms of nonlinear dynamics. 
In this formulation, cognition is the perpetual breaking and reforming of constraints 
to produce progressively complex order. There is no mental agent exploiting rules and 
manipulating sensory data. Instead, the cognitive system is softly assembled organism 
and in direct contact with a world rich with environmental structure. The soft assembly 
of the cognitive system and its tendency toward interaction-dominance leaves it open 
to reorganization and sensitive to what new structure the environment might afford. En-
vironmental structure is the groundwork upon which the reorganization occurs, giving 
rise to emergent cognitive structure. Throughout, there is the ongoing sequence noted 
above, namely, the breaking and reforming of constraints. Changes in entropy and power-
law behavior each indicate this ongoing sequence, and we have shown these changes to 
hold for the emergence of cognitive structure in the gear-system task. We anticipate that 
concepts from nonlinear dynamics, such as entropy and power-law behavior, will soon be 
central to our understanding of cognition.
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